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Previous studies find that firms with prior debt, particularly publicly rated, 
have lower information asymmetry and experience a lower opportunity cost of 
going public, as measured by underpricing. Subsequent research suggests that 
underpricing may be an inaccurate measure of indirect issuance costs. Thus, 
we replicate and extend existing studies to examine whether previously issued 
debt reduces the true opportunity cost of issuance. We find that private debt 
issues have little effect; however, firms with public debt (particularly rated) 
have both significantly lower levels of underpricing and lower issuance 
opportunity costs, as well as narrower filing ranges and smaller price 
revisions, all of which are consistent with reduced asymmetry. We find, how-
ever, that matching issues by firm size eliminates the significant relations. 
Thus, we conclude that although prior public debt appears to reduce informa-
tion asymmetries, it is more likely a reflection of the underlying characteristics 
of firms with these existing securities.  
Introduction 
 When firms go public, they generally face indirect issuance costs that stem from 
various risk factors, a prime example of which is information asymmetry between 
issuers (i.e., sellers) and investors (i.e., buyers). The presence of asymmetry neces-
sitates selling shares at a discount in order to induce potential investors to participate 
in the offering. Therefore, all else equal, firms that have a greater level of publicly 
available information (i.e., lower asymmetry) should experience reduced issuance 
costs.  
 Firms that take on debt, whether private or public, submit themselves to the 
scrutiny of external parties, which may increase the amount of information available 
to potential investors and, therefore, also may reduce the cost of going public. Previ-
                                                          
*Much of this work, including data collection, was conducted while Pyles was at the 
University of Kentucky. 
24 Dolvin and Pyles 
ous studies (e.g., Cai, Ramchand, and Warga, 2004) examine this relation by 
evaluating the effect of prior debt on underpricing, which is the variable commonly 
used to measure the indirect cost of equity issuance. The results of these studies sug-
gest that the existence of prior debt issues, particularly those that are rated, reduces 
information asymmetry and underpricing.  
 Subsequent research (e.g., Dolvin and Jordan 2005), however, suggests that 
underpricing may be flawed as a measure of the indirect cost of issuance because it 
does not account for the share retention decision of preexisting owners, which is 
referred to as share overhang. Further, existing studies generally ignore underlying 
firm characteristics (e.g., firm size) that may be correlated with prior debt issuance. 
Therefore, the results of existing studies may or may not reflect the true relation of 
prior debt issues to the cost of going public. Our primary contribution is to address 
these shortcomings by examining the relation of prior debt issues to the level of 
information asymmetry and true opportunity cost of issuance, as well as by 
implementing controls for potential relations between debt issuance and firm char-
acteristics. 
 Across the entire sample, we find no significant relation between prior private 
debt issuance and underpricing. Further, we also find that prior private debt has little 
influence on reducing information asymmetry, as measured by the width of initial 
filing ranges and the extent of offer price revisions. Conversely, we find that firms 
with prior public debt issues have marginally lower underpricing and significantly 
lower opportunity costs of issuance. Consistent with these results, prior public debt 
appears to reduce information asymmetry, as filing ranges are narrower and price 
revisions are smaller. Further, we find that most of these relations are confined to 
those issuers with rated public debt, all of which is in line with previous studies.  
 To control for potential relations between prior debt issuance and underlying 
firm characteristics, we also examine various matched samples within our data set, 
first matching by date and issuing firm size. We find that the significant relation 
between prior debt issues and the opportunity cost of going public disappears using 
the matching approach, which suggests that the presence of prior debt may not 
reduce information asymmetry, but is serving as a proxy for underlying firm 
characteristics, primarily company size. We conclude that although our initial results 
are consistent with previous work, they appear to be driven by underlying relations 
that prior studies generally fail to consider.  
Information Asymmetry and the Cost of Going Public 
 Firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) face direct issuance costs in 
the form of a gross underwriting spread; however, the indirect costs of issuance are 
typically the largest component of the cost of going public. For example, Loughran 
and Ritter (2002) find that firms, on average, leave approximately $9.1 million on 
the table, which is roughly twice the amount of direct fees paid. Many potential 
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explanations exist for this large opportunity cost; however, one that forms the basis 
for multiple theoretical models is asymmetric information between buyers and sellers 
(e.g., Rock, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). The existence of asymmetric 
information forces issuers to offer shares at a discount, which implies a positive 
relation between asymmetric information and the cost of going public (i.e., money 
left on the table). Previous studies generally address this relation by examining 
underpricing, or initial return, which is defined as money left on the table (MLOT) 
divided by the proceeds of the offering.1 The implication is that characteristics that 
reduce (increase) information asymmetry should be associated with lower (higher) 
underpricing. 
 All else equal, studying the influence of information asymmetry on underpricing 
would be equivalent to studying the effect of asymmetry on MLOT. Underpricing, 
however, fails to control for the number of shares retained by preexisting owners, 
which is a decision that would affect underpricing but not MLOT. Underpricing 
implicitly assumes that all preexisting shares are sold in the offering, but this is 
rarely the case. As an extreme example, consider a firm that goes public by issuing a 
single share. Any level of underpricing is essentially irrelevant because its dilutive 
effect on the value of the firm would be minimal, and the money left on the table 
would be minor in comparison to the overall stake of preexisting owners.  
 Put differently, the wealth effect on preexisting owners (i.e., MLOT) is deter-
mined by the risk of the offering, including the amount of asymmetric information, 
not by the share issuance decision. Thus, studies that focus on underpricing may or 
may not reach accurate conclusions regarding the underlying relations between char-
acteristics of the offer and the cost of going public. Specific to this study, reduced 
information asymmetry should result in a smaller opportunity cost of issuance; how-
ever, if fewer shares are issued, underpricing may be higher relative to a comparable 
firm that issues more shares. 
 Dolvin and Jordan (2005), following Barry (1989), formally address the relation 
between underpricing and the true wealth effect of an IPO, finding that underpricing 
is the product of two underlying components: the wealth effect and the share reten-
tion (i.e., overhang) decision. In addition, Dolvin and Jordan define the wealth effect 
in percentage terms, which they refer to as the opportunity cost of issuance (OCI): 
 
OPNNP
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−
−==  (1) 
where E represents the preexisting equity value and is equal to the market value of 
the firm after the offering less any new proceeds raised from newly created (i.e., 
primary) shares. (Any secondary shares sold create proceeds for selling shareholders, 
                                                          
1 The traditional definition of underpricing is the percentage change from the offer price to the 
closing market price on the first day of trading; however, these are equivalent definitions. 
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not for the firm itself.) In addition, No is the number of shares offered in the IPO; P1 
is the market price at the end of the first trading day; OP is the offer price; NA is the 
total number of shares after the offering; and No,p is the number of primary (i.e., 
newly created) shares offered. Their derivation and results suggest that failing to 
control for the share retention decision introduces potential bias; therefore, in exam-
ining the relation between information asymmetry and the cost of going public, we 
study both underpricing and OCI. 
 As an example, consider two firms (A and B) that face the same level of under-
pricing. Assume each firm has 100 preexisting shares and, for simplicity, no primary 
shares are being issued (i.e., a pure secondary offering). Further assume that pre-
existing owners of Firm A choose to issue 25 shares, while Firm B owners choose to 
issue 50 shares. Thus, Firm A has greater share overhang. Also assume each firm 
offers shares at a price of $10 and that the aftermarket price for each is $12, thereby 
implying an initial return of 20 percent for both firms. 
 Using equation (1), this example illustrates that preexisting owners in these two 
firms, even with the same level of underpricing, experience different indirect (i.e., 
opportunity) costs of issuance. Specifically, owners of Firm A issue half as many 
shares at a discount (less money left on the table), and the shares they retain are 
worth the market value after the offer. Thus, the cost of going public for Firm A is 
lower than for Firm B. Specifically, calculating OCI for Firm A gives a value of 4.17 
percent (50/1200), whereas the OCI for Firm B is 8.33 percent (100/1200).2  
 To further illustrate what OCI is measuring, consider the following equivalent 
formula for calculating OCI: 
 OCI = 
B
s,o
N
N
(Cost of Secondary Shares Sold) 
+ 
B
r,B
N
N
(Cost of Secondary Shares Retained) (2) 
where No,s is the number of preexisting (i.e., secondary) shares sold in the offering; 
NB is the number of preexisting shares prior to the offering; and NB,r is the number of 
preexisting shares retained. This equation illustrates that OCI is essentially a 
weighted average of costs, where the weights capture the percentage of secondary 
shares that are sold (i.e., No,s/NB) and the percentage of secondary shares that are 
retained (i.e., NB,r/NB). The cost of sold shares primarily captures money left on the 
table, whereas the value of retained shares is affected by dilution associated with 
selling new shares at a price below market value. Underpricing fails to control for the 
                                                          
2 Note that the preexisting equity value is equal to the market value after the offering because 
no primary shares are being created and issued. This example is readily extended to include 
primary shares. Moreover, with primary shares it is simple to illustrate that firms with the 
same amount of money left on the table could have a different OCI. 
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share issuance decision, thereby failing to measure the true cost to preexisting own-
ers. As an example, consider using equation (2) to calculate OCI for the two firms in 
our example: 
 Firm A: ( ) %17.40
100
75
12
1012
100
25OCI =+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=  
 Firm B: ( ) %33.80
100
50
12
1012
100
50OCI =+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=  
both of which match the OCI values reported above. Because no primary shares are 
sold, there is no dilution in firm value as a result of the offering. [See Barry (1989) 
and Dolvin and Jordan (2005) for a more complete illustration and discussion of this 
alternative formula.] 
 Specific to this study, previous results suggest that prior debt issues reduce 
underpricing and conclude that this implies a reduction in the cost of going public. If 
firms that have previously issued debt also retain fewer shares, however, then the 
lower level of underpricing may not translate into a lower cost of going public for the 
preexisting owners of the firm.  
Prior Debt Issues and Information Asymmetry 
 The majority of firms that go public in the equity market are small and not well-
known, which exacerbates the amount of information asymmetry investors face. 
Exceptions may exist, however, particularly when you consider firms that have 
previously raised capital in markets other than equity. For example, a firm that 
assumes private debt subjects itself to the monitoring of the lender, which may 
reduce information asymmetry between the borrower and lender (e.g., Peterson and 
Rajan 1994), as well as between the borrower and other firm claimants (e.g., Fama, 
1985). Additionally, those firms that have previously issued public debt already pro-
vide publicly available information that is readily accessible by potential equity 
investors. Thus, it is possible that preexisting debt issues, private and/or public, may 
moderate information asymmetry and, therefore, reduce the cost of going public.  
 Previous studies have investigated the possible influence of individual types of 
preexisting debt on the equity issuance process. For example, James and Wier (1990) 
find that firms with prior private debt outstanding exhibit lower underpricing, which 
they attribute to a signaling effect. The ability to take on private debt is considered a 
signal that the firm is of high value. Schenone (2004) concentrates on the period 
following the effective repeal of the Glass-Steagel Act (i.e., 1998 and after), which 
previously prevented commercial banks from underwriting security issues. Schenone 
finds that firms that borrow from commercial banks that have the ability to take the 
firm public exhibit lower underpricing than those firms that borrow from commercial 
banks that are not able to take the firm public.  
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 Moreover, because commercial banks could not take firms public in earlier peri-
ods, Schenone’s (2004) discussion suggests that private debt issues should have no 
effect on reducing information asymmetry or the cost of going public for IPOs taking 
place prior to the repeal of the Glass-Steagel Act, in contrast to the theoretical pre-
diction of Fama (1985) and the empirical results of James and Wier (1990). 
Schenone does not compare firms with prior private debt to other IPOs, however, 
and both of the aforementioned empirical studies focus on underpricing, although 
OCI is most likely of greater importance, particularly to the issuing firm. 
 Cai, Ramchand, and Warga (2004) compare equity IPOs that have previously 
issued public debt to those that have not, finding that public debt, particularly rated 
debt, appears to reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of going public. 
Similar to other studies, however, the focus is again placed on underpricing, not the 
underlying opportunity cost of issuance. Cai, Ramchand, and Warga do extend their 
analysis, on a univariate basis only, by examining the effect of prior public debt on 
initial filing ranges and offer price revisions and find that firms with prior public 
debt generally have narrower ranges and smaller revisions, which they attribute to 
reduced information asymmetry. In addition, their study does not address prior pri-
vate debt. Thus, we consolidate and extend these existing studies by addressing the 
relation between the opportunity cost of going public (and information asymmetry) 
and both prior private debt and prior public debt (rated versus unrated) for firms 
going public in the 1986 to 2000 period.  
 Moreover, none of the above studies consider the possible relation between prior 
debt issuance and underlying firm characteristics. For example, it would be easier for 
larger and/or more profitable firms to assume debt, and these same firms typically 
also would represent those with a relatively smaller level of information asymmetry. 
Ignoring these characteristics may bias existing results by attributing a reduction in 
information asymmetry to the issuance of debt rather than to the underlying firm 
characteristics that initially enabled the firms to assume debt. Thus, we also extend 
our analysis to control for these potentially important firm characteristics. 
Data Description 
 Our main data source is Thomson Financial’s SDC New Issues database. SDC 
captures prospectus information on firm commitment initial public offerings (IPOs), 
including the existence and rating of prior public debt issues. In addition to company 
and issue information provided by SDC, we rely on the University of Chicago’s 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to provide closing market 
prices and shares outstanding information on the date of issuance. We also collect 
information on firms with prior private debt issues from the Loan Pricing Corpora-
tion’s (LPC’s) Dealscan database. SDC began reporting data on several important 
items in 1986; after the bubble period of 1999-2000, there were relatively few IPOs. 
Therefore, the primary period we study is January 1, 1986, to December 31, 2000. 
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LPC only provides data beginning in 1987; thus, as a robustness check we repeat all 
analyses starting in 1987, as well as in 1990. We find that our general results are 
unchanged. 
 We make numerous corrections to SDC data using information from Jay R. 
Ritter (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/) on a variety of items such as incorrect file 
ranges and offer type classifications. We also use Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) 
updated underwriter reputation variables [i.e., updates to those originally provided by 
Carter and Manaster (1990)], firm founding dates, and Internet classification data. 
 As is commonly done, we eliminate various types of issues, including closed-
end funds, unit issues, American depositary shares, mutual-to-stock conversions, 
reverse leveraged buyouts, real estate investment trusts, and spin-offs. Unlike many 
studies, we also eliminate firms with multiple share classes. The reason is that 
determination of overhang, and therefore OCI, can be problematic in such cases, 
particularly in circumstances where, for example, one Class A share can be con-
verted into multiple Class B shares. After elimination of these issues, we are left with 
a final sample of 4,510 IPOs, represented by 91 issues with prior public debt, 599 
issues with prior private debt, and 3,818 issues with no prior debt.3  
Summary Statistics 
 We begin by examining variables related to information asymmetry and the cost 
of going public. Specifically, we calculate mean values for three types of issues (i.e., 
those with prior public debt, those with prior private debt, and those with no prior 
debt), as well as t-statistics from difference of means tests, assuming unequal vari-
ances, between each of these types of issues. We report the results in Panel A of 
Table 1.  
 Underpricing (i.e., Initial) is lowest for those issues with prior public debt and 
highest for those issues with prior private debt. This finding suggests that the exis-
tence of prior public debt issues reduces the cost of going public, but prior private 
debt issues increase the cost, which contrasts with the results of previous studies 
(e.g., Fama, 1985; James and Wier, 1990). Recall that underpricing does not measure 
the true wealth effect of the offering because it fails to control for the share retention 
decision. OCI, which does account for the level of share retention, appears to be 
lowest for those issues with prior public debt and highest for those without any debt, 
suggesting that both types of prior debt reduce issuance costs, but the reduction is 
more pronounced for public debt issues.  
 
                                                          
3 There are 23 issues with both prior private and public debt. We code these as having public 
debt. For robustness we examine specifications where we code these issues as private debt and 
also where we create a variable identifying the issues as having both types of prior debt; 
however, we find that the results are consistent with those reported (i.e., there is no 
incremental effect associated with multiple types of previous debt issues). 
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Table 1—Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Information Asymmetry and Issue Costs 
 Public Private None  t-statistics 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) v (2) (2) v (3) (1) v (3) 
N 91 599 3818     
Initial 16.02 26.99 22.51  -2.60 1.92 -1.77 
OCI 1.82 4.51 5.57  -1.64 -3.54 -2.28 
Range .14 .16 .15  -2.09 2.17 -1.26 
Revision .34 .67 .62  -2.00 .79 -1.79 
        
Panel B: Firm and Issue Characteristics 
 Public Private None  t-statistics 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) v (2) (2) v (3) (1) v (3) 
n 91 599 3818     
Sales 396.57 110.70 106.66  4.23 .34 4.28 
Assets 511.44 82.39 217.25  5.72 -2.49 3.19 
Proceeds 130.35 41.39 39.70  5.04 .85 5.14 
VC .36 .52 .41  -3.02 5.19 -.99 
Age 17.16 11.60 11.85  2.14 -.40 2.08 
Integer .82 .80 .75  .43 2.37 1.49 
HT .40 .40 .36  -.03 1.91 .76 
Internet .09 .09 .10  -.05 -.85 -.41 
Rank 8.36 7.42 6.79  5.97 7.18 11.00 
Primary .68 .56 .66  2.38 -4.54 .55 
NasLag 1.52 .84 1.18  1.07 -1.63 .55 
PartialU 8.03 9.67 8.26  -.80 1.83 -.12 
PartialD -9.34 -6.98 -6.64  -1.66 -.70 -2.32 
Nineties .90 .91 .79  -.38 9.57 3.57 
Bubble .33 .18 .16  2.83 1.03 3.30 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for IPOs for the 1986 to 2000 period, segmented by issuers 
with prior public and prior private debt issues. Columns 1 through 3 report means and the final three col-
umns report t-statistics from difference of means tests assuming unequal variances. Panel A reports 
variables related to information asymmetry and the cost of going public. Panel B reports firm and offer 
characteristics 
 
 The next two variables we report measure the width of the initial filing range 
and the level of offer price revision, respectively. Following Cai, Ramchand, and 
Warga (2004), these variables proxy for information asymmetry, as reduced asym-
metry should result in less uncertainty surrounding the offer price. We calculate 
Range as the original high filing price less the original low filing price, divided by 
the middle of the filing range. We follow Ljungvist and Wilhelm (2002) and define 
Revision as the offer price less the initial low filing price, divided by the difference 
between the initial high and low filing prices.4 Issues with prior public debt appear to 
                                                          
4 For robustness, we also define the revision as the partial adjustment, which is the percentage 
change from the initial midfile price to the offer price, but we find the results to be 
qualitatively similar to those reported. Following Cai, Ramchand, and Warga (2004) we also 
define the filing range as the difference between the initial high and low filing prices, divided 
by the low filing price; however, we find the general results to be unchanged. 
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have marginally narrower ranges and smaller revisions, suggesting a reduction in 
information asymmetry; however, it does not appear that prior private debt has a 
similar effect. 
 The results to this point fail to account for underlying issue characteristics that 
also may be influencing the relations. Thus, to begin to explore potential causes of 
the above differences, we report descriptive statistics on some selected firm and offer 
characteristics in Panel B of Table 1. The variables in the panel are representative of 
the types commonly examined in IPO research, but the list is not intended to be 
exhaustive. Specifically, we report means and t-statistics from difference tests for the 
following: 
 Sales = Gross sales, in millions of dollars, of the issuing firm in the year 
prior to issuance; 
 Assets = Total asset value, in millions of dollars, of the issuing firm immedi-
ately prior to issuance; 
 Proceeds = Gross proceeds of the issue in millions of dollars; 
 VC = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is venture capital backed; 
 Age = Firm age, measured in years; 
 Integer = Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO offer price is an integer; 
 HT = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in a “high-tech,” but non-
internet-related, industry; 
 Internet = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is internet-related; 
 Rank = Carter-Manaster (1990) rank of the lead underwriter, as updated by 
Loughran and Ritter (2004); 
 Primary = Dummy variable equal to one if the offering has 100 percent primary 
shares; 
 NasLag  = Return on the Nasdaq composite index for the 15 trading days prior 
to the issue; 
 PartialU = The percentage change (from the original midfile) in the final offer 
price if the change is positive (and zero otherwise);  
 PartialD = The percentage change (from the original midfile) in the final offer 
price if the change is negative (and zero otherwise); 
 Nineties  = Dummy variable equal to one if the issue takes place in the 1990 to 
1998 period; and 
 Bubble  = Dummy variable equal to one if the issue takes place in the 1999 to 
2000 period. 
 Compared to issues with prior private debt and those with no prior debt, issues 
with prior public debt appear to be larger, older, and associated with higher quality 
underwriters, all of which could reduce asymmetry and, therefore, the cost of going 
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public.5 It also appears that a larger percentage of the IPOs with prior public debt 
occurred in the internet bubble period of 1999 to 2000, which typically would result 
in higher average underpricing. Thus, the lower levels observed may be more sig-
nificant than the univariate results indicate. Comparing IPOs with prior private debt 
to those with no prior debt, they appear to be similar in size and age, although those 
with prior private debt do appear to be more likely to be backed by a venture capi-
talist, have a higher quality underwriter, and be less likely to be a pure primary 
offering.  
 Thus far, it appears that prior public debt issues have a more significant effect in 
reducing asymmetry and issue costs than prior private debt. Within the public debt 
sector, issues that are rated typically would have a greater amount of information 
available, thereby reducing asymmetry even further. Thus, we split the IPOs with 
prior public debt into rated and unrated issues, and we report the results of this com-
parison in Table 2. 
 Economically, we find that issuers with rated debt experience lower issue costs 
and smaller offer price revisions. In contrast to our expectations, we find only mar-
ginal statistical significance, which may be related to the small sample size and high 
variability among issuers. Thus, on the surface it appears that whether the debt issue 
is rated or not is of little importance; however, the true relation may be influenced by 
other underlying effects. For example, firms with rated debt appear to be larger, as 
well as less likely to be high-technology or internet firms, all of which are character-
istics that are consistent with lower levels of asymmetry and cost relations.6 
 
                                                          
5 Unfortunately, data on pre-issue firm size (i.e., assets and sales) are not available for all firms 
in our sample. Therefore, the averages reported for those variables are derived from a smaller 
sample. Specifically, we have firm size data for 65 of the issues with prior public debt, 516 of 
those with prior private debt, and 2,515 of those with no prior debt. It is with these 
observations that we complete our multivariate analyses throughout the paper. This is a 
necessary action, as our results indicate that firm size is an important contributor to 
understanding the overall relationship we examine. As a crude check, we examine the 
characteristics of those issues dropped versus those retained (primarily for the public debt 
sample) and conclude there are no significant differences between the groups.  
6 As a further analysis, we separate our rated debt into investment grade (BBB- or better) and 
speculative grade (BB+ or worse) issues as identified by Standard & Poor’s ratings. The 
rationale for this analysis is that firms with an investment grade rating are perceived as being 
of higher financial quality, which is a signal (i.e., a type of certification) to investors that 
effectively may reduce asymmetry and lower issue costs. Of the 63 rated issues, there are only 
five that are investment grade. We find no significant relations in any of the primary variables 
of interest. Regardless, for robustness we consider alternative specifications of the models that 
include variables to control for the level of the rating. We find no significant relations in any 
specification. 
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Table 2—Summary Statistics by Public Debt Segment 
Panel A: Information Asymmetry and Issue Costs 
 Rated Non-Rated t-statistic 
 (1) (2) (3) 
N 63 28  
Initial 11.38 26.64 -1.49 
OCI .57 4.69 -1.60 
Range .14 .15 -.89 
Revision .21 .61 -1.35 
 
Panel B: Firm and Issue Characteristics 
 Rated Non-Rated t-statistic 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sales 447.62 206.93 1.76 
Assets 569.80 294.70 2.50 
Proceeds 136.69 115.86 .71 
VC .31 .46 -1.35 
Age 19.38 12.18 1.42 
Integer .83 .79 .46 
HT .31 .61 -2.66 
Internet .05 .18 -1.68 
Rank 8.24 8.64 -1.87 
Primary .63 .82 -2.05 
NasLag .78 3.23 -1.92 
PartialU 8.41 7.16 .39 
PartialD -10.33 -7.12 -1.21 
Nineties .89 .93 -.60 
Bubble .30 .39 -.87 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of IPOs that had a public debt issue prior to 
the offering, segmented by those with rated debt and those with unrated debt. Columns 1 and 2 provide 
means for the identified segments, and Column 3 reports the t-statistics from difference tests assuming 
unequal variances. Panel A reports variables related to information asymmetry and the cost of going pub-
lic, and Panel B reports firm and offer characteristics  
The Effect of Prior Debt on Equity Issuance 
 The variation in the univariate results for the firm and offering characteristics 
above suggests that the differences in issue costs and information asymmetry may be 
driven by factors (e.g., size and/or age) other than the existence of prior public or 
private debt. Therefore, we control for these underlying characteristics by estimating 
the parameters of the following model: 
 Depi  = α + β1Private + β2Public + β3LnAssets 
+ β4 LnProceeds + β5VC + β6LnAge + β7Integer 
+ β8HT + β9Internet + β10Rank + β11Primary 
+ β12NasLag + β13PartialU + β14PartialD 
+ β15Nineties + β16Bubble + εi  (3) 
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either Initial, OCI, Range, or Revision. 
Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer has prior private debt, zero 
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otherwise, and Public is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer has prior public 
debt outstanding, zero otherwise. The remaining independent variables serve as con-
trols and are as previously defined.7 
 The natural logarithm of total assets at issuance is included as a proxy measure 
for information asymmetry, as larger firms are likely to be more well-known in the 
market and, therefore, have lower asymmetry.8 The natural logarithm of the size of 
the deal is a common conditioning variable. Earlier research (e.g., Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991) finds that venture capitalists perform a certification role; however, 
more recent evidence (e.g., Loughran and Ritter 2004) suggests that VC backing has 
no significant effect over the period we study. To control for this relation, we include 
the VC dummy variable. The age of the firm may affect the amount of information 
available, thus we also include LnAge. 
 Bradley, Cooney, Jordan, and Singh (2004) find that IPOs priced on an integer 
exhibit greater underpricing, which they attribute to pricing uncertainty and the lack 
of time available to negotiate an offer price. Thus, we include the Integer dummy 
variable. High technology issues, particularly those that are internet related, have 
received increased focus during the period we study, as they typically are associated 
with higher levels of underpricing (and asymmetry). Thus, we include the dummy 
variables HT and Internet. We also include the underwriter quality variable (Rank), 
as Dolvin (2005) finds that underwriter certification has a significant effect, particu-
larly once we control for the level of overhang. 
 The lag variable (NasLag) proxies for investor sentiment and the existence of a 
hot IPO market. PartialU and PartialD control for the well-known partial adjustment 
phenomenon. Following Bradley and Jordan (2002), we include separate variables 
for upward and downward adjustments because recent studies find evidence of an 
asymmetric effect (i.e., upward adjustments have a greater impact). We also include 
the time period dummies (Nineties and Bubble), as Loughran and Ritter (2004) find 
differing results over these periods. We report the results of this analysis in Table 3.9 
In regressions (2), (4), (6), and (8), we further split Public into dummy variables that 
identify if prior public debt is rated (PublicRated) or nonrated (PublicNonRated). 
                                                          
7 Rather than the absolute size of the offer, we use LnProceeds, which is the natural logarithm 
of the proceeds amount in millions of dollars, inflation adjusted to 1986 values. Rather than 
the absolute age of the firm, we use LnAge, which is the natural logarithm of one plus the age 
of the issuing firm in years. Also, rather than the absolute size of the issue firm, we use 
LnAssets, which is the natural logarithm of the asset value in millions of dollars. 
8 In unreported results, we replace LnAssets with LnSales, as both may proxy for the size of 
the issuing firm prior to issuance. The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
9 Note that in regressions (5) through (8) we do not include the partial adjustment variables, as 
Revision is a measure of this movement and Range proxies for a similar notion. For 
robustness, we include PartialU and PartialD in the regression with Range as the dependent 
variable and find our results to be consistent with those reported. 
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Depi =  α + β1Private + β2Public +β3LnAssets+ β4LnProceeds + β5VC + β6LnAge 
+ β7Integer + β8HT + β9Internet + β10Rank+ β11Primary + β12NasLag 
+ β13PartialU + β14PartialD + β15Nineties + β16Bubble + εi       
 
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either Initial, OCI, Range, or Revision 
Table 3—Regression Results   
                     Initial                                           OCI                       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 6.84 2.86 6.83 2.86 3.72 4.32 3.72 4.33 
Private 1.50 1.20 1.50 1.20 -.65 -1.44 -.65 -1.44 
Public -5.47 -1.68   -2.55 -2.17   
PublicRated   -4.87 -1.34   -2.94 -2.24 
PublicNonRated   -7.67 -1.13   -1.12 -.46 
LnAssets -.54 -1.02 -.54 -1.02 -.23 -1.22 -.23 -1.22 
LnProceeds -1.52 -1.62 -1.53 -1.62 .56 1.65 .56 1.65 
VC .09 .08 .09 .09 -.03 -.06 -.03 -.07 
LnAge -.23 -.44 -.23 -.44 .14 .76 .14 .77 
Integer 3.51 3.21 3.51 3.21 1.14 2.88 1.14 2.89 
HT 3.40 3.16 3.41 3.17 -.21 -.55 -.22 -.56 
Internet 18.63 7.01 18.63 7.01 -.86 -.90 -.86 -.90 
Rank .18 .57 .18 .58 -.35 -3.07 -.35 -3.09 
Primary 1.89 1.87 1.89 1.87 .66 1.81 .66 1.80 
NasLag .71 6.54 .71 6.55 .08 1.97 .08 1.95 
PartialU 1.01 27.22 1.01 27.20 .09 6.51 .09 6.52 
PartialD .33 7.02 .33 7.03 .15 8.98 .15 8.97 
Nineties 3.96 2.88 3.98 2.88 1.82 3.67 1.82 3.66 
Bubble 16.79 8.98 16.79 8.98 -.68 -1.01 -.68 -1.01 
N 2,976 2,976 2,976 2,976     
Adj. R. Sq. .4103 .4101 .0857 .0855     
         
                      Range                                       Revisions                  
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept .09 13.78 .09 13.78 -.66 -5.73 -.66 -5.73 
Private .00 .56 .00 .56 .02 .31 .02 .31 
Public -.02 -1.73   -.49 -3.45   
PublicRated   -.02 -1.51   -.45 -2.84 
PublicNonRated   -.02 -.90   -.62 -2.15 
LnAssets -.00 -1.95 -.00 -1.95 -.19 -8.15 -.19 -8.16 
LnProceeds .00 .13 .00 .13 .64 15.66 .64 15.65 
VC .00 1.17 .00 1.17 .11 2.36 .11 2.37 
LnAge .00 2.51 .00 2.51 -.02 -.84 -.02 -.84 
Integer .01 .91 -.01 -3.09 .03 .65 .03 .65 
HT .01 4.13 .01 4.13 .14 2.97 .14 2.98 
Internet .01 .91 .01 .91 1.05 9.62 1.05 9.62 
Rank .01 9.04 .01 9.04 -.03 -1.84 -.03 -1.84 
Primary -.01 -2.53 -.01 -2.53 -.12 -2.69 -.12 -2.69 
NasLag .00 1.29 .00 1.29 .04 9.24 .04 9.25 
PartialU         
PartialD         
Nineties .01 2.25 .01 2.25 -.17 -2.76 -.17 -2.75 
Bubble -.00 -.04 -.00 -.04 -.19 -2.42 -.19 -2.41 
N 2,976 2,976 2,602 2,602     
Adj. R. Sq. .0799 .0796 .2244 .2242     
Note: This table presents regression results from the estimation of the following model:  
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 We begin by examining the relation between prior debt and the cost of going 
public (measured by both Initial and OCI) in Table 3.10 The coefficients on the con-
trol variables are generally in line with previous studies (e.g., Dolvin and Jordan, 
2005). For example, issues with greater proceeds are associated with lower under-
pricing, but higher OCI. Further, issues priced on an integer have higher 
underpricing and issue costs. Issues taken public by higher quality underwriters have 
lower OCI. Also, issues going public during the bubble period, particularly those that 
were internet related, have higher levels of underpricing.  
 Specific to the focus of this study, prior private debt is not significantly related 
to underpricing or OCI, suggesting that prior private debt does not reduce indirect 
issuance costs.11 These results are in contrast to Fama (1985) and James and Wier 
(2004), but they are consistent with the implicit predictions of Schenone (2004). 
Specifically, the majority of the IPOs we examine (i.e., 1986 to 1997) take place 
prior to the repeal of the Glass-Steagal Act; thus, Schenone predicts that prior debt 
issues should have no influence on reducing issuance costs. 
 In contrast to prior private debt, prior public debt is associated with both lower 
underpricing (although only marginally) and lower OCI, which suggests that prior 
public debt reduces the cost of going public (most likely from reduced information 
asymmetry), but private debt does not. Distinguishing between rated and unrated 
public debt (i.e., regressions 2 and 4) reveals that the reduction in costs, particularly 
OCI, is primarily a result of rated debt, which is consistent with a larger amount of 
information being available for these issues. As a whole, our results to this point lend 
support to the conclusions of Cai, Ramchand, and Warga (2004) that rated public 
debt reduces issuance costs; however, our findings provide more specific evidence 
on the true opportunity cost of issuance, as well as on the impact of the debt issue 
being rated. 
                                                          
10 The empirical specification for underpricing is based implicitly on the premise that the 
market price at the end of the first trading day reflects the true value of an issue, but some 
studies find market overreaction. This issue, assuming any overreaction is not systematic, 
should not bias our results. Moreover, because the offer price typically is adjusted 
immediately prior to issuance, it also would reflect any bias. Thus, because we measure the 
difference, rather than concentrating specifically on the aftermarket price, any potential bias 
should have little effect on our results. Further, by controlling for various time periods and 
issue characteristics, we broadly control for any potential bias associated with overreaction. 
We thank an anonymous referee for making this point. 
11 Although OCI controls for the level of share retention, it is possible that the level of stock 
retained is in itself a signal of issue quality. To address this possibility, we sort issues into 
those with overhang levels at or above the median (2.27) and those below. We repeat our 
analysis and find no significant differences in our results. We also repeat our analysis after 
including share overhang as an independent variable; however, our results again remain 
qualitatively unchanged. We thank an anonymous referee for making this point. 
Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics, Vol. 46, No. 2 37 
 If prior debt issues reduce information asymmetry, then we would expect offer 
prices to exhibit lower volatility. Thus, to further examine the likelihood that the 
reduction in issue costs stems from lower information asymmetry, we also examine 
filing ranges and price revisions in Table 3. Consistent with Range and Revision 
measuring price volatility, many of the independent variables that control for asym-
metry have the expected sign. For example, larger issuing firms are associated with 
smaller filing ranges and revisions. Also, high technology issues have larger filing 
ranges and revisions. Surprisingly, however, some variables have contrasting 
relations to Range and Revision. For example, higher quality underwriters are asso-
ciated with smaller revisions, but larger filing ranges, which may result from larger 
underwriters being able to exert market power over their clients (e.g., Dolvin, 2005). 
Also, issues going public in the 1990s are associated with larger filing ranges, but 
lower revisions.  
 As above, the primary variables of interest are Private and Public, as well as the 
related dummy variables. Consistent with the insignificant relation between prior 
private debt and issue costs, we find that prior private debt issues have no influence 
on filing ranges or price revisions. We do find, however, that the existence of prior 
public debt is associated with both narrower filing ranges (again, marginally) and 
smaller price revisions, both of which are consistent with lower information asym-
metry, as well as with the reduced cost of issuance discussed above. In contrast to 
our previous findings, the effect of prior public debt on price revisions seems unre-
lated to whether the debt is rated.  
Public Debt Matched Sample 
 Our results above, consistent with previous studies, suggest that rated debt 
generally reduces the amount of information asymmetry and, therefore, lowers the 
cost of going public, but prior private debt has little influence. These results, how-
ever, evaluate firms with public debt (a small number) relative to all other IPO’s and 
potentially mask the relations relative to more comparable firms. Thus, to make the 
comparison more meaningful, we create a matched sample of firms, where we match 
by offer date and issuing firm size, as measured by total assets.12 
 Based on our findings above (i.e., only public debt appears to be important), we 
conduct the matched analysis for firms with prior public debt. With the matched 
firms, we have a sample of 130 observations (65 with prior public debt and 65 
matched firms). We repeat the second (i.e., even numbered) regression for each 
dependent variable in Table 3 and report the results in Table 4. Interestingly, we find 
the results to be much different.  
 
                                                          
12 For robustness, we also match by sales, SIC code, profitability, proceeds, and age, generally 
finding similar results, particularly when matching size-based criteria. 
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Table 4—Matched Sample Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Initial           OCI           Range        Revision    
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 6.64 .33 -6.01 -.52 .12 2.89 .17 .15 
Rated -3.76 -.59 -2.65 -.72 -.02 -1.71 -.37 -1.27 
PublicNonRated -8.51 -.87 -2.03 -.36 -.02 -1.06 -.78 -1.78 
LnAssets -.49 -.12 -3.25 -1.36 .01 1.75 -.35 -1.91 
LnProceeds -4.05 -.65 5.96 1.66 -.01 -1.12 .62 2.20 
VC 2.89 .45 3.90 1.05 .00 .16 .20 .69 
LnAge 3.56 1.14 -.62 -.34 -.00 -.36 .11 .74 
Integer 5.48 .71 1.70 .38 .02 1.33 .18 .48 
HT 2.70 .36 -6.57 -1.53 .01 .95 .40 1.19 
Internet 17.69 1.44 -12.35 -1.74 -.03 -1.05 .92 1.70 
Rank -.30 -.12 -.24 -.17 -.00 -.00 -.13 -.93 
Primary 3.52 .58 5.47 1.55 .00 .24 -.09 -.31 
NasLag 1.29 2.36 .01 .03 .00 1.38 .10 4.38 
PartialU .72 3.91 .16 1.52     
PartialD .55 1.95 .24 1.48     
Nineties 8.96 .75 5.19 .76 .00 .03 .23 .37 
Bubble 22.01 2.90 -2.30 -.52 .01 .68 -.20 -.59 
N 130 130 130 130 
Adj. R2 .3660 .0589 -.0299 .2477 
Note: This table presents regression results from the estimation of the following model:  
 
Depi =  α + β1Rated + β2PublicNonRated + β3LnAssets+β4LnProceeds + β5VC  + β6LnAge 
+ β7Integer + β8HT  + β9Internet + β10Rank+ β11Primary + β12NasLag + β13PartialU 
+ β14PartialD + β15Nineties + β16Bubble + εi       
 
where Dep is the dependent variable and is Initial, OCI, ShareOver, Range, or Revision 
 
 There now appears to be no highly significant relation between prior public 
debt, rated or not, and either of the issuance cost variables (i.e., Initial or OCI). Fur-
ther, the relation to the offer price variables is only marginally significant. These 
results, based on our matching approach, are likely a product of underlying charac-
teristics of the issuing firm that are reflected by their ability to assume public (or 
private) debt. In this particular situation, the ability to take on debt seems to be a 
reflection of the size of the issuing firm. Thus, failure to specifically control for this 
characteristic masks the true underlying relation. Therefore, the documented rela-
tionship between prior debt issuance and information asymmetry, which we (and 
others) previously find support for, seems to be a reflection of underlying firm char-
acteristics (i.e., size).  
Additional Robustness Checks 
 The formal regression model we suggest has a number of independent variables 
that may be related (e.g., Table 1). Thus, our results may be affected by multicollin-
earity. Therefore, we run a series of robustness tests designed to control for this 
possibility. Specifically, we begin by analyzing variance inflation factors (VIFs). A 
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suggested rule of thumb is that a value higher than 10 is problematic. Our factors are 
all below 3.0, with only three variables having a VIF above 2.0. The variables that 
have the strongest relation are LnSize and Rank. To address the possible effects of 
multicollinearity, we separately repeat the regressions using only one of these 
variables. We also conduct a similar process with the time period dummy variables, 
which exhibit a slight positive correlation. Our results in each case remain 
unchanged. 
 Rather than segmenting by public and private debt, we also conduct an analysis 
using dummy variables that identify (1) whether a firm had any type of debt and 
(2) whether the debt was public (e.g., the incremental effect of public debt). As 
would be expected, we find consistent results with those reported. To control for 
possible relations between public and private debt, we also separately examine IPOs 
with prior private debt relative to issues with no prior debt, as well as IPOs with prior 
public debt relative to issues with no prior debt. We find consistent results with those 
reported. 
 The results in Table 1 suggest that a greater percentage of the issues with prior 
public debt occurred during the internet bubble period (i.e., 1999 to 2000). Although 
we attempt to control for this relation using a time period dummy, we conduct an 
additional check by examining the pre-bubble period separately from the bubble 
period. We find that the coefficient on Private is larger and more significant in the 
1986 to 1997 period and smaller and less significant in the post-Glass-Steagal period, 
both of which are consistent with Schenone’s predictions.13 The general results as 
reported above, however, are consistent across periods. 
 Last, following Cai, Ramchand, and Warga (2004) we eliminate firms with 
founding dates prior to 1970, as it is possible that these firms had public debt 
outstanding prior to this period. If firms did have debt prior to this date, SDC would 
fail to capture this information. We find that this elimination has little effect on our 
results, and our conclusions remain unchanged. 
Conclusion 
 Many theories that attempt to address the large positive opportunity costs associ-
ated with equity issuance base their models on the existence of asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers. Prior empirical studies that examine this 
relation typically concentrate on underpricing and find, consistent with theoretical 
predictions, that there is a positive relation between information asymmetry and the 
cost of going public. Dolvin and Jordan (2005), following Barry (1989), illustrate 
that focusing on underpricing may produce biased results, as this measure fails to 
                                                          
13 Note that we cannot make a strict comparison to Schenone (2005) for the post-Glass-Steagal 
period because we do not have information on lenders that are able to take the firm public, as 
this is beyond the scope of our study.  
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control for the share retention decision. Thus, we replicate and extend existing stud-
ies by examining the influence of prior debt on the true wealth effect (i.e., 
opportunity cost of issuance—OCI) of the offering. 
 Specifically, we examine firms going public that have previously issued either 
private or public debt, hypothesizing that these previous security issues increase the 
amount of information available for potential equity investors and, therefore, reduce 
the cost of going public. Rather than focusing purely on underpricing as a measure of 
the cost of going public, we also examine the true wealth effect of the offering (i.e., 
OCI). We find that prior private debt is insignificantly related to OCI, which con-
trasts with prior studies; however, prior public debt, particularly rated debt, is 
negatively related to the cost of going public. We further extend our analysis by 
examining the relation between prior debt and both file ranges and price revisions. 
Consistent with the results related to the opportunity cost of issuance, we find that 
prior private debt is insignificantly related to these measures of asymmetry.  
 Another important omission in existing studies is a failure to control for underly-
ing firm characteristics that may be associated with both the ability to issue debt 
(public or private) and the level of information asymmetry. Thus, we extend our 
analyses using a matched sample based on issue date and issuer size, as measured by 
firm assets. We find that the significant relationship between prior debt and issue 
costs disappears with this matching process.  
 As a whole, our preliminary results suggest that the negative relation between 
prior public debt and indirect issuance costs appears consistent with reductions in 
information asymmetry, which matches the findings of existing studies. The exten-
sions we employ suggest that the relation is more likely a result of underlying firm 
characteristics rather than a true issuance cost reduction. Therefore, we conclude that 
the documented negative relationship is perhaps overemphasized and that any future 
study should make efforts to control for firm characteristics that are likely driving the 
results.  
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